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Psychiatric inpatients, consisting of 32 males and 33 
females between the ages of 15 and 58 completed Rotter's 
(1966) Internal-External Locus of Control (I-E) Scale. The 
scale was administered individually to the patients at both 
admission and discharge, at the Crisis Stabilization Unit 
(CSU) in Orlando, Florida. Analysis of variance was used 
to determine whether there were significant differences due 
to commitment status (voluntary and involuntary), diagnosis 
(thought and affective and other disorders) , and change 
scores (admission versus discharge) . The hypothesis that 
involuntary patients would produce significantly higher 
scores was not confirmed. Further, no significant differ-
ence was found due to diagnosis. A second hypothesis that 
patients would score more internally at the time of dis-
charge versus initial admission also was not confirmed. 
Therefore, there were no differences in I-E scores before or 
after treatments regardless of diagnosis or commitment sta-
tus. There is no evidence to conclude that in terms of 
treatment, involuntary commitment is detrimental to the 
patients. 
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REFERENCES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Involuntary commitment of patients to psychiatric fa-
cilities has "long perplexed the mental health and legal 
professions" (White and White, 1981, p. 953). In the 18th 
century, the few asylums in the United States were seen as 
"places of last resort" which removed the insane person 
from the community to protect the individual and the commu-
nity. As psychology developed in the 19th century, confine-
ment of the mentally ill took on rehabilitative aspects and 
the state transferred responsibility for the treatment of 
these individuals to the mental health profession. Mean-
while, legal procedures were being established for the in-
voluntary commitment of psychiatric patients (White and 
White, 1981). 
There has been much debate on involuntary hospitaliza-
tion. Chodoff (1976) examined three points of view concern-
ing society's right to involuntarily hospitalize a mentally 
ill individual. Chodoff labelled those persons who are op-
posed to involuntary commitment the "abolitionists". The 
abolitionists hold the viewpoint that involuntary hospitali-
zation should never be resorted to under any circumstances. 
Chodoff reports that many psychiatrists belong to this 
group, and that for them, mental illness does not exist in 
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the field of psychiatry. The medical model of "mental ill-
ness" is rejected entirely, and acceptance of the medical 
model is a "fiction accepted jointly by the state and by 
psychiatrists as a device for exerting social control over 
annoying or unconventional people" (p. 497). The abolition-
ists believe that these individuals should be allowed the 
dignity of being responisible for their behavior and re-
quired to accept its consequences. Members of this group 
are not opposed to psychiatric treatment, but if voluntary 
cooperation on the patient's part could not be enlisted, 
then the psychiatrist would step aside and "allow social, 
legal, and community sanctions to take their course" 
(Chodoff, p. 497). 
Chodof f labelled members of the second group the "medi-
cal model psychiatrists". These physicians believe that 
mental illness is a meaningful concept and that under cer-
tain conditions the state has the right and an obligation to 
arrange for the hospitalization of a sick individual, even 
if this means that he is deprived of his liberty. It is 
held that it would be far more cruel to leave the ill person 
at liberty ! and that the patient has a ''right to treatment". 
Chodoff wrote, "To remove the protective mantle of illness 
from these disturbed people is to expose them, their fami-
lies, and their communities to consequences that are cer-
tainly maladaptive and possibly irreparable" (p. 497) . He 
insists that mental illness does exist, but he recognizes 
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that not all people being treated by psychiatrists should be 
included as being mentally ill, but that t~ere are those 
desperately ill persons for whom involuntary commitment must 
be considered. 
Chodoff labels a third group the "civil liberties law-
yers". These persons do not necessarily reject the neces-
sity for involuntary hospitalization, but they do wish to 
reject the importance of medical model criteria in the hands 
of psychiatrists. They believe the standards of dangerous-
ness are more objective and more capable of being handled in 
the courts as it is more possible to bring evidence to bear 
on each case. 
Each group has its own arguments as to why their point 
of view is valid. The first and third groups argue that 
psychiatrists are in the position of being able to abuse 
their power, that they commit persons for reasons other than 
the correct, legal, and ethical ones. Hiday (1976) examined 
commitment laws in one state by studying court records and 
observing commitment hearings. She concluded that although 
fewer people are being committed, she still found occur-
rences where commitment resulted because the judges def-
ferred to psychiatrist's opinions, rather than a preponder-
ance of evidence. In another study, Affleck, Peszke, and 
Wintrob (1978) asked psychiatrists to respond to question-
naires regarding their knowledge of the commitment laws in 
their jurisdictions. They reported that few of the 
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psychiatrists did have a thorough understanding of those 
laws, that in some instances these physicians not only mis-
understood the laws, but that they substituted their own 
criteria to commit the patients. In a series of newspaper 
articles, Mathers (1982) pointed out that critics of 
Florida's commitment law have charged that it is used as a 
tool to control indigents and vagrants. It was also pointed 
out that judges do not question the opinions of the psy-
chiatrists at local commitment hearings. However, a study 
by Appelbaum and Hamm (1982) presents evidence to show that 
in nearly all instances, psychiatrists involved in commit-
ment proceedings are very aware of local commitment laws 
and that they initiate commitment proceedings in accordance 
with those laws. 
Chodoff (1976) acknowledges that the potential for 
abuse of these laws is there, but he still concluded that 
involuntary commitment should still be the domain of the 
medical model psychiatrists as they are in the best position 
to deliver appropraite treatment to the patients, provided 
those doctors can work with strict legal safeguards to 
protect patient's rights. 
Involuntary commitment itself is not the only issue to 
be considered. Courts have been reviewing committed pa-
tients' rights to refuse various types of treatment, most 
notably, chemotherapy. White and White (1981) addressed 
this topic and report that, in general, the Supreme Court 
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upholds the patient's right to refuse chemotherapy, except 
where the patient is clearly a danger to himself or others. 
Weiner (1982) reports that since the late 1960s there 
have been numerous lawsuits filed against mental health in-
stitutions in an effort to improve patient care, define pa-
tients' rights and to narrow the criteria for civil commit-
ment. By and large, the district and appellate courts have 
ruled in favor of the mental health advocates, but the re-
views by the Supreme Court have resulted in decisions which 
reject broadly worded commitment laws and which uphold the 
traditional reliance on decision-making by medical profes-
sionals. It appears that involuntary commitment of indivi-
duals who meet the criteria will continue to occur, but as 
the courts rule in favor of patients' rights, alternatives 
to the traditional medical model of treatment which includes 
chemotherapy will have to be found. White and White (1981) 
state that there will be an increased demand by patients for 
nonmedical treatments and that there will be a greater role 
for psychology professionals in inpatient treatment in the 
years ahead. 
As evidenced above, much has been written on the ethi-
cal and legal aspects of involuntary hospitalization, but 
little in the literature deals with the treatment of invol-
untarily committed patients. Szasz (1977) addressed himself 
to to the issue of treatment and concluded that in terms of 
treatment, involuntary commitment is detrimental to the 
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patient. Szasz used this argument to support the abolition-
ist point of view described above. However, in a study com-
paring both voluntary and involuntarily committed patignts, 
Gove and Fain (1977) concluded that there is nothing detri-
mental to the patients in the commitment process. 
In reviewing the literature, little was found on the 
relationship between either voluntary or involuntary commit-
ment and personality variables. It would seem that invol-
untarily committed patients' perceptions of their own abili-
ty to control their lives would differ significantly from 
patients who initiated hospitalization voluntarily. Locus 
of control is a personality variable which can be measured 
to assess an individual's perception of his or her own abi-
lity to control his or her life circumstances. There has 
been research into locus of control in psychiatric patients 
(Harrow and Ferrante, 1969; Fontana, Klein, Lewis and 
Levine, 1968; Leggett and Archer, 1979), but most of these 
have not addressed the topic of the relationship between lo-
cus of control and voluntary versus involuntary committed 
patients. One study (Levenson, 1972) described later in 
this paper, ·did look at the above mentioned relationship, 
but she used her own locus of control measure, rather than 
an older, more established measure of locus. 
In the ensuing sections, locus of control will be de-
fined and described. Its origin in social learning theory 
will be discussed, and locus of control as a personality 
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variable, particularly for psychiatric patients, will be 
examined. Considerations in the measurements of locus of 
control will be reviewed as well. Procedures of involuntary 
commitment unique to Florida law will be reviewed. The pur-
pose of the present study is to examine locus of control 
perceptions from both the voluntary and involuntary commit-
ment frame of reference, in an effort to determine differ-
ences between the commitment alternatives. 
II. THE LOCUS OF CONTROL CONSTRUCT 
Definition and Description of Locus of Control 
Rotter (1966) did much of the original research on the 
locus of control concept and he defined it as follows: 
The effect on a reinforcement following some behavior 
on a part of a human subject, in other words, is not a 
simple stamping-in process, but depends upon whether or 
not the person perceives a causal relationship between 
his own behavior and the reward. A perception of 
causal relationships need not be all or none, but can 
vary in degree. When a reinforcement is perceived by 
the subject as following some action of his own but not 
being entirely contingent upon his action, then, in our 
culture, it is typically perceived as the result of 
luck, chance, fate, as under the control of powerful 
others, or as unpredictable because of the great com-
plexity of the forces surrounding him. When the event 
is interpreted in this way by an individual, we have 
labelled this a belief in external control. If the 
person perceives that the event is contingent upon his 
own behavior or ·his own relatively permanent character-
istics, we have termed this a belief in internal con-
trol (p. 1). 
Locus of control, then, refers to one's orientation as 
to his or her own ability (or lack thereof) to control, 
through his or her own behavior, subsequent reward or pun-
ishrnent. Phares (1976) sees locus of control as a continuum. 
Persons who believe that they can control reinforcement 
through their own behavior (internals) are at one extreme, 
while persons who believe that reinforcement is independent 
of their behavior (externals) are at the other extreme. He 
further suggests that "perceived locus of control may be 
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viewed as a somewhat narrow expectancy arising out of a 
specific situation or it may be viewed as a relatively 
stable characteristic that persons carry with them from 
situation to situation" (p. 6). He further points out that 
"behavior is determined both by the structure of the situa-
tion and by the beliefs or expectancies brought to the situ-
ation by that person, with the relative contribution of each 
varying from situation to situation in lawful ways" (p. 6). 
Various researchers have addressed themselves in de-
scribing the characteristics of internals versus externals. 
In reviewing the literature, Kinnaird (1977) wrote a charac-
ter sketch of persons with an internal locus orientation 
versus persons with an external locus orientation: 
To summarize, a character sketch of the individual with 
internal locus of control shows him to be a striving, 
cognitive, achievement-oriented, self-directed person 
who copes actively with his environment and expects to 
succeed. He is likely to be white and of middle class 
or higher status, and have had a secure and consistent 
upbringing. The external individual is apt to come 
from a less stable home, a lower socio-economic level, 
and/or ethnic minority and to be less likely to seek 
information or attempt to control his environment, but 
is more likely to take a chance (p. 39). 
Joe (1971) reported that many researchers have investi-
gated the relation of internal-external locus of control to 
personality characteristics, and he drew the following con-
clusion: 
The findings depict externals, in contrast to internals, 
as being relatively anxious, aggressive, dogmatic~ an~ 
less trustful and more suspicious of others, lacking in 
self-confidence and insight, having low needs for 
social approval, and having a greater tendency to use 
sensitizing modes of defenses (p. 623) · 
10 
On the other hand, internals seem better able to cope 
with their environment and are more self-confident and 
self-directed than are externals. There are much data to 
support this view. Several researchers indicated that in-
ternal individuals are most likely to have satisfactory per-
sonal adjustment {Joe, 1971; Phares, 1976; Hersch and 
Scheibe, 1967). Phares (1976) describes internals as 
active, striving individuals who exhibit greater re-
sistance to influence and who seem to handle success 
and failure in a more realistic fashion than externals 
... by contrast, externals should be more vulnerable and 
less capable of coping with their environment (p. 120). 
However, Rotter {1966) saw a curvilinear relationship 
between locus of control and pathology, where persons at 
both extremes of the internal-external continuum are seen as 
maladjusted. But, Rotter (1975) also pointed out that one 
problem in conceptualization of the locus of control con-
struct is the idea that internals are good and externals are 
bad. He states that there is no logical basis to assume 
that it is good to be internal and bad to be external. Re-
searchers need to be aware of this and avoid the mistake of 
assuming pathology just because a person's scores on a locus 
of control measure show him to have an external frame of 
reference. 
Origin of Locus of Control in Social Learning Theory 
Social learning theory of personality integrates both 
reinforcement and cognitive approaches. It defines person 
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ality as learned behavior which is the result of the inter-
action of learned responses, acquired meanings, and physio-
logical factors. This learned behavior is modifiable and 
changes with experience. Social learning has been described 
in various papers (Rotter, 1954, 1966; Phares, ·1976). The 
locus of control concept developed out of social learning 
theory and interest in this variable developed as Rotter 
and others made the consistent observation that "increments 
and decrements in expectancies following reinforcement ap-
peared to vary systematically, depending on the nature of 
the situation and also as a consistent characteristic of 
the person being reinforced" (Rotter, 1975, p. 56). 
Rotter (1975) sees the crucial determinants of be-
havior as: (1) the reinforcement, whether it is positive 
or negative; (2) the past history, sequence, and patter-
ning of such reinforcements; and (3) the value attached to 
each reinforcement. In an earlier article, Rotter (1966) 
listed four classes of variables which are important in pre-
dieting behavior in the context of reinforcement theory. 
These classes of variables are behavior, expectancies, rein-
for~ements, and phychological situations. He utilized these 
variables in his general definition of behavior: 
The potential for a behavior to occur in any specific 
psychological situation is a function of the expectan-
cy that the behavior will lead to a particular rein-
forcement in that situation and the value of that re-
inforcement (1975, p. 57). 
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Phares (1976) defined those variables important in pre-
dicting behavior which were listed above. Reinforcement is 
"anything that has an effect on the occurrence, direction, 
or kind of behavior" (p. 15) . Rotter (1954) defined expect-
ancy as the "probability held by the individual that a par-
ticular reinforcement will occur as a function of a specific 
behavior on his part in a specific situation or situations" 
(p. 107) • Phares (1976) differentiated between generalized 
and specific expectancies by pointing out that when indivi-
duals were in a novel situation, "generalized expectancies 
will be more important in determining their expectancy than 
will specific expectancies based on prior experience in that 
situation. When individuals have had a great deal of experi-
ence in a given situation, generalized expectancies will be 
the primary determinants" (p. 16) . One determinant of the 
relative importance of generalized versus specific expectan-
cies (in the same situation) is the amount of experience the 
individual has had in that particular situation. In deter-
mining behavior, the importance of generalized expectancies 
goes up as various situations are more novel and go down as 
a person's experience in that particular situation increases. 
It is important to understand the relationships of expectan-
cies to situations. According to Rotter (1975), this helps 
us to understand under what conditions clear predictions 
might be exptected from an accurate measure of generalized 
13 
expectancies, such as his internal-external (I-E) locus of 
control scale (Rotter, 1966). 
In social learning theory, the psychological situation 
is seen as an important determinant of behavior. Phares 
(1976) suggests that careful analysis of situations is im-
portant in order to identify the cues that can, for a given 
person, affect the expectancies and reinforcement values. 
"Although personality traits or dispositions are important, 
failure to take account of the psychological situation sig-
nificantly reduces predictive efficiency" (p. 17). He also 
pointed out that the structure of a specific situation af-
fects an individual's behavior as well as that person's gen-
eralized beliefs about locus of control. Phares (1976) sum-
marized this by pointing out that locus of control can be 
seen as a more or less stable characteristic which persons 
carry with them from situation to situation, or as a some-
what narrow expectancy which arises out of some specific 
situation. 
Measurement of Locus of Control 
In view of the fact that locus of control may be seen 
as a stable characteristic generalizable across many situ-
ations or a narrow expectancy associates with a specific 
situation, it is obvious that different measures of locus of 
control are necessary, depending upon the purpose of the re-
search. To devise a good instrument, Phares (1976) points 
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out that it is desirable to make clear exactly what is be-
ing measured. 
There have been several measures of locus of control, 
for both adults and children. The scope of this paper does 
not permit exhaustive explanations of each measure, but they 
are listed, and those that seem pertinent to this work will 
be described in more detail. 
One of the earlier measuring devices was the Intellec-
tual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaires (IAR) devel-
oped by Crandall, Katkovsky, and Crandall (1965). This meas-
ure focuses on locus of control in intellectual achievement 
situations, and is used primarily with children. Another 
measurement used with children is the Nowicki-Strickland 
Locus of Control Scale for Children (1973). The authors re-
port that studies have found significant correlations be-
tween this measure and achievement test scores. For pre-
school children, the Stanford Preschool Internal-External 
Scale (SPIES) was developed by Mischel, Zeiss, and Zeiss 
(1974). 
Perhaps the most important measure of locus of control 
has been Rotter's (1966) Internal-External (I-E) Locus of 
Control Scale. Here, the items on the scale represent an 
attempt to sample locus of control beliefs across a wide 
range of situations, such as interpersonal situations, gov-
ernment, work, and politics (Phares, 1976). Because it sam-
ples a wide range of expectancies, the I-E scale is a 
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measure of generalized, rather than specific, expectancies. 
Phares (1976) explains what the I-E scale, a generalized 
measure of locus of control, can and cannot do: 
What a general measure of locus of control allows us to 
do is describe each individual's "average" locus of con-
trol attributes over many situations. But we should 
remember that the wider the range of situations, the 
less predictive the concept will be. Therefore, I-E 
may do a good job of predicting people's behavior in 
general but miss rather badly in any specific situa-
tion. Whether we can tolerate such misses depends upon 
our purposes (p. 46). 
Rotter (1966) designed the I-E scale unidimensionally, 
that is, a person's score reflects whether he is internal or 
external on a continuum, with internals at one end and ex-
ternals at the other. The I-E scale is seen as a measure of 
generalized, rather than specific, expectancies because the 
questions on this scale represent an attempt to sample locus 
of control beliefs in a wide range of situations (Phares, 
1976). The I-E scale consists of 29 items, presented in a 
dyadic, forced choice format. One point is given each time 
an external statement is selected by the subject, and the 
possible range of scores is from zero to 23. Included in 
the scale are six filler items which are not scored. Phares 
reports that filler items were included to at least partial-
ly disguise the purpose of the questionnaire. 
Phares (1976) states that the test-retest reliability 
for the I-E scale appears to be adequate. Rotter (1966) re-
ported that reliabilities for several samples varied from 
.49 to .83, depending upon the sample and time interval 
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involved. Concerning psychiatric patients, Harrow and 
Ferrante (1969) reported a reliability figure of .75 over 
a six week period. Using college students for subjects, 
Hersch and Scheibe (1967) administered the I-E scale and 
three different measures of intelligence and reported that 
correlations between the I-E scale and intelligence were 
nonsignificant. 
It may appear that a generalized measure would be im-
potent in the face of so many specific situations. But 
Phares (1976) cites reasons for conceptualizing personality 
in terms of broad dispositions and having appropriate meas-
ures for them. For instance, the clinician/psychologist must 
predict what patients are likely to do in situations and 
circumstances that are unknown to them. He may be asked, for 
example, "if John Doe is discharged from the hospital, how 
will he do?" In other words, the clinician is being asked 
about the effects of many situations, not just one. Most 
clinicians have no way of knowing what will happen to Mr. 
Doe five years in the future. Phares (1976) concludes, "The 
lack of information regarding the nature of specific situa-
tions may force us to rely more heavily than we would like on 
general personality factors" (p. 47). It is for this reason 
that Rotter's I-E scale has been used so often since first 
presented. Rotter's (1966) monograph on locus of control 
has not only prompted much research (Thornhill, Thornhill, 
and Youngman [197~ presented a computerized bibliography on 
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locus of control which had over 1200 references) , but also 
generated criticism as well. 
The criticism of the I-E scale centers around two 
issues. The first concerns the issue of specificity-
generality, which has been alluded to earlier. As pointed 
out, the I-E scale measures generalized rather than specific 
expectancies of locus of control. Rotter (1975) noted that 
previous researchers have misused the I-E scale by trying to 
use it in the prediction of specific behaviors for specific 
situations, and he urged researchers to take this into con-
sideration before designing their research. He pointed out 
that it would be a difficult undertaking to construct a dif-
ferent measure for each conceivable specific purpose, but 
also acknowledged that specific measures do have their place. 
One measure of specific expectancies that is of use 
with psychiatric patients is the Mental Health Locus of Con-
trol (MHLC) Scale developed by Hill and Bale (1981). This 
scale is designed to measure specific expectancies concern-
ing who will be in control, that is, responsible for change, 
in mental health treatment situations. These authors point 
out that what clients expect from a therapist will influence 
such vitally important processes as whether the clients take 
the first step in entering therapy and how these clients in-
terpret and respond to treatment. These expectancies can 
also play a role in determining the course and eventual out-
come of treatment. Hill and Bale state that the MHLC is 
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designed specifically to meet the need for an instrument to 
measure locus of control expectancies for situation in-
volving client-therapist interactions. The MHLC contains 28 
statements concerning mental health. With each statement 
there is a six point scale which allows the subject to agree 
or disagree with that particular statement. Included in 
this measure are six filler items, as in Rotter's I-E scale. 
Also, like the I-E scale, the MHLC is a bipolar construct 
where the two poles represent belief in either internal or 
external control. 
Hill and Bale (1981) also developed a second scale, the 
Mental Health Locus of Origin (MHLO) Scale. Constructed in 
a similar manner to the MHLC, and MHLO scale is designed to 
measure beliefs about the etiology of psychological problems. 
At one end of this scale is a component labelled endogenous 
beliefs which refers to patients' perceptions attributing 
"mental illness" to factors such as heredity and organicity. 
At the other end of the scale is the interactional pole, 
where persons perceptions regarding the etiology of mental 
illness emphasizes interpersonal and intropsychic causes of 
mental illness. 
Hill and Bale (1981) analyzed the validity of their 
MHLC and MHLO scales using 147 female and 79 male college 
students. They found that the correlation between the MHLC 
and MHLO scales was .40 (p(.001). Using the same 226 college 
students, they also compared the correlation between MHLC 
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and MHLO, the correlation was .18 (p<.OOl). They concluded 
that their measures were valid, but they also pointed out 
that they used college students in their samples, and they 
recognized the need for validity studies using different 
subject populations. 
A second criticism of the I-E scale which has generated 
other research has been the issue of unidimensionality-
multi-dimensionali ty. For instance, Levenson (1981), ques-
tioned "the validity of combining under the rubric of exter-
nal control, as Rotter did, the expectancies of fate, chance, 
and powerful others" (p. 15). Levenson (1973) had developed 
her own locus of control scale which separated the I-E scale 
into three different dimensions of expectancy, which were 
presented as scales: the Internal (I) Scale, the Powerful 
Others (P) Scale, and the Chance (C) Scale. The I, P, and C 
scales originated because of . the idea that people who believe 
in one external orientation such as the belief in the power-
ful others will think and act differently than those who see 
the world as unpredictable, which is a different external 
orientation. Levenson points out that the major implication 
of this was that individuals who see the world as unordered 
should be expected to act differently from people who be-
lieve powerful others are in control. 
Levenson (1973) administered her I, P, and C scales to 
psychiatric patients in a state hospital and found that pa-
tients who were involuntarily committed held the attitude 
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that powerful others controlled their lives (an external 
orientation) significantly more than voluntary psychiatric 
patients. She also reports, however, that there were no 
significant differences between committed and voluntary pa-
tients on her other two scales, the internal and chance 
scales. 
It should be noted, however, that Rotter (1966) ac-
knowledged the multidimensionality aspect and reported that 
he also attempted to isolate different dimensions. Rotter 
reported that these isolated dimensions in his early re-
search were not sufficiently reliable to indicate separate 
subscales. Phares (1976) makes this comment about multi-
dimensional scales: "Obviously, if one constructs a scale 
so that it reflects several dimensions, it is not surprising 
to find evidence of such dimensions" (p. 50) . He concluded 
that while there is evidence of separate factors, there is 
less evidence that demonstrates their ability to make accu-
rate predictions. 
To summarize, there are several different measures of 
locus of control which are available to the researcher. 
Which measure is selected depends on the purpose of the re-
search involved. Rotter's I-E scale has been used exten-
sively in locus research which includes studies involving 
psychiatric patients. It is important to realize that this 
scale measures generalized expectancies, rather than specif-
ic expectancies, in adults. This scale cannot make specific 
21 
predictions of behavior, but it can assist the clinician in 
making generalized predictions of behavior. 
Locus of Control as a Personality Variable 
Joe (1971) reviewed the literature on locus of control 
as a personality variable. He looked at the relation of I-E 
scale scores to personality characteristics, ethnic and 
social class differences, anxiety, attempts to control the 
environment, achievement motivation, reaction to social 
stimuli, reaction to threat, risk-taking, and psychological 
adjustment. 
In addition, he examined locus of control research with 
anxiety as measured by self-report measures. Externals de-
scribed themselves as anxious, less able to show constructive 
responses to frustration, and more concerned with fear of 
failure than with achievement. Internals, on the other hand, 
described themselves as more concerned with achievement, 
more constructive in overcoming frustration, and being less 
anxious. 
Joe (1971) also cited a group of studies that support 
the hypothesis that internals show more initiative and ef-
fort in controlling their environment, and can better con-
trol their impulses than externals. Related to this is a 
study by Seeman and Evans (1962). Using tuberculosis pa-
tients, they focused on the relationships between locus of 
control and knowledge and information seeking behaviors of 
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the patients. They found that internals asked more ques-
tions of doctors and nurses, and knew more about their spe-
cific situation than did externals. 
Joe (1971) reported that several investigators had de-
monstrated a relationship between internal-external locus of 
control and psychological adjustment, where pathological 
subjects were reported to have higher external scores than 
normal subjects. Hersch and Scheibe (1967) administered 
Rotter's (1966) I-E scale and other self-report measures 
such as the Incomplete Sentences Blank (ISB) , the California 
Psychological Inventory (CPI) and the Psychasthenia section 
of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 
to college students. These authors report that internal 
scorers on the I-E scale are less maladjusted as shown by 
their scores on the other measures administered. 
Joe (1971) further noted that studies involving locus 
of control and social class and ethnic differences found 
that blacks and lower class persons usually had higher ex-
ternal scores than did whites and middle class persons. In 
reviewing these studies, he concludes: 
Data are consistent with the theoretical expectation 
that individuals who are restricted by environmental 
barriers and feel subjected to limited material oppor-
tunities would develop an externally oriented outlook 
on life. Also, social class interacts with race so 
that individuals from the lower classes and minority 
groups tend to have high expectancies of external con-
trol (p. 624). 
Joe (1971) also reviewed the research as concerns locus 
of control and persons' reactions to social stimuli. Rotter 
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(1966) hypothesized that internals would be able to resist 
environmental manipulations (provided that they were aware 
of those manipulations) , while externals would be less re-
sistive as they already had expectancies of environmental 
control. Joe (1971) found that some studies have confirmed 
this hypothesis while others have not. He suggested that 
"more attention should be given to exploring the hypothesis 
that internals conform only if they perceive conforming to 
be to their advantage" (p. 630). 
Joe (1971) reports also that the research indicates a 
relationship between suicide proneness and externality, and 
that externals tended to more often report feelings of anger 
and depression. In reviewing these results and the results 
showing that pathological subjects had higher external 
scores, Joe questioned whether "a belief in external control . 
produces psychopathology or whether psychopathology produces 
a belief in external control" (p. 633). He then concluded 
that the study of locus of control is relevant to studying 
psychopathology. This is reflected in several studies con-
cerning psychiatric patients. 
Locus of Control and Psychiatric Patients 
As Joe indicated, several researchers have found a re-
- lationship between locus of control and psychological adjust-
ment. Shybut (1968) reported that psychotic subjects had 
higher external scores than did neurotic and normal subjects. 
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He also suggested that prolonged hospitalization can cause 
a person's belief in external control to be increased and 
reduce his belief that he can attain long-range goals. 
Levenson (1973) administered her I, P, and C scales to func-
tionally psychotic and neurotic inpatients in a state hospi-
tal. Results showed that, when compared to normal samples, 
the inpatients perceived control by chance forces and power-
ful other significantly more often. She readministered her 
scales to the patients one month later. While overall the 
patients scored higher on the Internal scale, there was no 
significant difference in patient's scores on the Chance and 
Powerful Others scales. Levenson speculated as to these re-
sults: 
It may be that the patients who remained in the hospi-
tal long enough to be retested were less susceptible 
to change on these measures, or that high perceptions 
of control by powerful others or chance were maintained 
as a function of prolonged length of institutionaliza-
tion (p. 404). 
This result suggests that as length of hospitalization in-
creases, patients' perceptions of external control do not 
diminish. 
Harrow and Ferrante (1969) administered Rotter's I-E 
scale to upper middle class patients during their first and 
seventh weeks of hospitalization. These authors looked at 
general characteristics of locus of control in these pa-
tients with the following factors in mind: the distribution 
of patients on the locus of control continuum; the relation-
ship between their I-E scores and diagnoses; and the 
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relationships between their I-E scores and age and sex. 
They also looked at locus of control score changes following 
seven weeks of hospitalization to determine (1) whether or 
not psychiatric patients become more internal as their path-
ology decreases during treatment; (2) how changes in their 
I-E scores were related to their formal diagnosis and (3) 
how locus of control orientation changes were related to age 
and sex. 
Overall, the authors report that data collected on 
their psychiatric samples did not differ significantly from 
non-psychiatric samples. The mean locus of control score 
obtained from the samples overall was 8.70, well within the 
range of mean scores listed by Rotter (1966). Harrow and 
Ferrante created diagnostic subgroups in the following way: 
schizophrenics, depressives, character disorders, manics, 
and other. They reported that the schizophrenic subgroup 
had a mean score of 10.07, which was significantly above the 
mean of the total remaining subjects. This shows that, as a 
group, schizophrenics were more external in locus orienta-
tion. Harrow and Ferrante explained why they thought schiz-
ophrenics exhibit more externality: 
Looked at in terms of their history, the schizophrenic 
sample should contain a greater percentage of patients 
who have had long-standing difficulties in adjustment 
and have experienced chronic disappointment. Furth~r­
more, this disorder includes symptoms such as delusions 
and paranoid ideation which are threatening to others, 
produce greater social stigma and may ~ead to a se~se 
of personal futility, with some resulting externality 
(p. 584). 
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Depressives, in this study, tended to produce more in-
ternal scores. The authors account for this finding by ex-
plaining that in the population they studied, the depressives 
had a better premorbid adjustment and that their disorder 
was not as chronic as the schizophrenic. 
Harrow and Ferrante (1969) reported that patients 
classified as character disorders also scored more internal-
ly than schizophrenics. They pointed out that these pa-
tients usually have problems in only one or two areas which 
are usually related to their lifestyle, and that for the 
most part, these patients have performed in social and occu-
pational areas in a competent way for many years. 
Harrow and Ferrante pointed out that when manics are 
initially hospitalized, they usually are displaying grandi-
ose thinking about their ability to control their lives. 
This was suggested to explain the result that manic patients 
were significantly more internal in locus orientation than 
the total sample of non-manic patients. 
As mentioned earlier, the I-E scale was readministered 
at the end of six weeks treatment in this study. It was 
predicted that patients would be more internal, based on the 
hypothesis that an increased sense of personal mastery, 
brought about by symptom relief, could lead towards in-
creased internality. Results indicated that there was a 
trend towards internality, but it was non-significant. But 
when analyzed by the different subgroups, different results 
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were evident. Schizophrenics were more external, but this 
trend was non-significant as well. These schizophrenics 
were considered very "sick" and the chronicity of their prob-
lems seemed to account for these results. In general, the 
non-schizophrenics {not counting the manics) did become 
slightly more internal during the six weeks of treatment. 
This was seen particularly in those patients labelled char-
acter disorders. The authors acknowledged that much of the 
character pathology remained in these patients, but accounted 
for this result by pointing out that at least the acute rea-
son for their admission had been relieved and these patients 
were now free to return to their old level of functioning. 
Depressed patients scored significantly more internally 
when the I-E scale was read.ministered. As their symptoms 
diminished, the patients became more internal. The authors 
believed that as the patients returned to their premorbid 
levels of self-esteem and control, their confidence in-
creased and hence, the more internal score. 
At the end of the six weeks, manic-depressive patients 
became more external. Harrow and Ferrante pointed out that 
during hospitalization they recover from their original 
grandiosity and become more aware of their own limitations. 
This shift towards externality, in manics, is considered to 
be a shift towards reality, hence a positive outcome of 
treatment. No significant differences were noted between 
younger and older patients at the end of six weeks treatment, 
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when the I-E scale was readministered. However, there was 
evidence to show that females, in general, scored more in-
ternally. 
Overall, Harrow and Ferrante's study showed that acute 
psychiatric symptoms and hospitalization did influence some 
of the I-E scores in one direction or the other, depending 
on the patient's diagnosis. This study supports Rotter's 
(1966) contention that persons scoring near the extreme ends 
of the I-E continuum ~re more maladjusted whereas persons 
scoring in the middle are more likely to be better adjusted 
psychologically. The study also suggests that, in psychi-
atric patients, an external orientation can be changed to an 
internal one. 
Related to Harrow and Ferrante's results is a study by 
Fontana, Klein, Lewis and Levine (1968). They demonstrated 
that schizophrenics who wanted to appear very sick scored in 
the external direction on the I-E scale. Of these results, 
Joe (1971) writes, "The implication is that internals wish 
to convey to others that they are normal and well adjusted 
while externals wish to impress upon others that they are 
"sick" so they cannot be held accountable for their behav-
ior" (p. 634). This study also supports Rotter's idea that 
individuals at the extreme ends of the locus of control 
continuum are maladjusted. 
III. THE INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF 
PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS 
Criteria on Procedures for Involuntary Conunitrnent 
Chodoff (1976) listed three criteria which should be 
utilized in determining whether or not a patient should be 
committed. All three must be met, according to Chodoff, 
before a patient can be conunitted. First, the person should 
be suffering from a mental illness. Chodoff points out that 
this is a complex concept, and there is lack of consensus 
about its meaning. His explanation of this concept, "ex-
tends the domain of illness to encompass certain forms of 
social deviance as well as biological disorders .... They 
(the patients) are all suffering both emotionally and phys-
ically, they are incapable by an effort of will of stopping 
or changing their destructive behavior, and · those around 
them consider them to be in an undesirable sick state and 
to require medical attention" (p. 498) . He points out that 
only a belief in the existence of mental illness can justify 
involuntary commitment. By looking at mental illness in 
terms of the medical model, it is understood that physicians 
are considered to be the "technically competent experts to 
deal with its effects" (p. 498). Secondly, the person must 
be experiencing a disruption of both intrapsychic (e.g., 
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depression, debilitating anxiety) and interpersonal (acting 
out towards others due to paranoid ideation, for example) 
functioning. Chodoff points out that this does not include 
a person's "minor peccadilloes or eccentricities" (p. 498). 
Also, "the behavior in question must represent symptoms of 
the mental illness from which the person is suffering" 
(p. 498). Included in these symptoms are those actions which 
cause a person to be a danger to himself or others. Third, 
there must be a need for care and treatment, and there must 
be facilities available for this purpose. Chodoff argues 
that if the state has the right to define those conditions 
necessary to commit someone, then the doctors have the right 
to ask for treatability of the patients as a criterion for 
commitment as well. 
Chodoff concludes that these procedures and criteria 
apply particularly to chronic recurrences and initial epi-
sodes of mental illness. Admittedly, Chodoff is in favor of 
involuntary commitment when appropriate, but he draws this 
conclusion in discussing the criteria for commitment: 
"it is necessary to find a way to satisfy legal and humani-
tarian considerations and yet allow psychiatrists access to 
initially and acutely ill patients in order to do the best 
that they can for them" (p. 498). 
In Florida, the guidelines for the commitment of men-
tally ill persons are similar to those outlined by Chodof f 
above. According to Florida State Statutes, Chapter 394, 
31 
Section 463, a person may be taken to a psychiatric re-
ceiving facility involuntarily under the following circum-
stances: 
1. He is mentally ill. 
2. He has refused voluntary examination by a doctor. 
3. He is unable to determine for himself that such 
examination is necessary. 
4. He is a danger to himself or others, or he is un-
able to care for himself. 
This period of involuntary examination, according to the 
Florida statutes, is not to exceed 72 hours without a court 
order for further treatment. 
Initiation of involuntary examination is done by the 
following methods: 
1. A court order, called an ex parte order, can cause 
a person to be taken to · a receiving facility. Usually court 
orders are obtained by friends and family members of the 
patient, or by social service workers with the Department of 
Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Usually three re-
sponsible adults swear out affidavits attesting to the prob-
lems of the patient in question, and after review by a cir-
cuit court judge, the order is issued. 
2. A law enforcement officer may take a person who ap-
pears to meet the criteria for involuntary examination de-
scribed above to a receiving facility for examination. That 
officer is required to make a written report as to his rea-
sons for bringing the pat1ent to that facility. 
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3. A physician, psychologist, psychiatric nurse, or 
clinical social worker (all licensed through the State of 
Florida) may also initiate involuntary examination. They, 
too, are required by law to make a written report as to 
their reasons for initiating the examination. 
After the person has arrived at the receiving facility, 
he is evaluated by a licensed physician. If that physician 
agrees with the need for inpatient treatment and that the 
legal criteria are met, he signs documents initiating the 
involuntary (inpatient) examination, which cannot exceed 72 
hours. If the psychiatrists in the receiving facility be-
lieve that the person needs longer inpatient treatment, 
then two psychiatrists or a psychiatrist and a psychologist 
are required to initiate proceedings for involuntary commit-
ment (this must be done within the 72 hour examination 
period). However, before a person can be committed, he has 
the right to a court hearing (which he also has the right to 
waive) in which the judge makes a decision concerning the 
disposition of the patient. The judge has three alternatives: 
Plan A: The person may be sent to a long term psy-
chiatric treatment facility. The amount of time a patient 
spends there depends upon the severity of his illness. None-
theless, patients committed in this manner are reviewed 
periodically by the courts and the hospital physicians. 
Plan B: The judge may decide to release the person in-
to his own care. 
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Plan C: The patient may be required to participate 
in inpatient treatment, usually 14 to 30 days, in a local 
psychiatric facility. 
Hereafter, for the purposes of this paper, commitment 
will refer to those individuals who are placed in a psychi-
atric facility involuntarily, whether for examination or 
actual commitment. 
A Comparison of Involuntary Versus Voluntary Patients 
In an attempt to compile more pertinent information as 
concerns the debate on involuntary commitment, authors have 
focused on comparisons of voluntary versus involuntary psy-
chiatric patients in hospital settings. Zwerling, Karasu, 
Plutchik and Kellerman (1974) did such a comparison, noting 
similarities and differences on different variables such as 
age, sex, religion, marital status, educational levels, and 
household composition. There were no significant differences 
between voluntary and involuntary patients. In their study, 
committed patients were found to have had prior hospitaliza-
tion. Also, voluntary patients were much more likely to 
have been referred by family and friends, where committed pa-
tients were referred by police, courts, or private psychi-
atric clinics. Zwerling et al. interpreted this to mean 
that "involuntary patients may be more chronically ill, or 
perhaps the treatment itself creates an aversion for seeking 
additional treatment voluntarily" (p. 83). 
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The patients were also assessed according to symptoms 
and it was found that voluntary patients had problems with 
depression and feelings of inferiority and that committed 
patients more often (but not significantly) showed more de-
lusions and inappropriate affect. In looking over their data, 
Zwerling et al. did not find any significant differences in 
the overall severity of illness between voluntary and com-
mitted patients, but did find that committed patients were 
more likely to be schizophrenic, assaultive, and agitated, 
while voluntary patients complained of depression, alcohol 
abuse, and drug abuse. It was also learned that committed 
patients more frequently left the hospital without permis-
sion (eloped) than voluntary patients. 
After assessing their overall information, the authors 
concluded that their results "offer ammunition for both 
sides of the debate concerning involuntary hospitalization" 
(p. 86). They argued that the high elopement rate of com-
mitted patients strengthens the anticornmitment positions of 
the civil libertarians. But they also stated that many pa-
tients who had refused hospitalization but were committed 
against their will did come to accept that hospitalization. 
The authors acknowledged that because of the patient's 
state of mind, commitment was the only way that some pa-
tients' "right to treatment" could be protected. But these 
authors held a critical view of commitment in their final 
conclusion: "Whether their numbers (that of patients who 
35 
need involuntary commitment) justify the perpetuation of a 
machinery for involuntary hospitalization which is so pat-
ently and relentlessly open to overuse and outright abuse 
is a judgment we leave to society--it is too grave an issue 
to be left to the mental health professionals" (p. 86). 
Gove and Fain (1977) followed up the above mentioned 
study and compared voluntary and involuntary patients before, 
during and after admission to a psychiatric hospital. In 
the prehospital phase, demographic information was gathered 
on the patients, and it was learned that committed patients 
tended to have a lower income than voluntary patients, but 
both had approximately the same educational levels, and 
voluntary patients were more likely to have been employed. 
At the time of admission, psychiatrists noted whether 
the patient was severely distressed by observing signs of 
worry, dysphoria, and agitation. They also noted whether 
the patient was disorganized in this thinking (e.g., hallu-
cinations, delusions, flight of ideas, gross confusion, etc.) 
and the severity of that disorganization. The collected 
data indicated that voluntary patients experience distress 
more than committed patients. The authors suggest that this 
means that the commitment process, in and of itself, does 
not seriously distress most patients. However, this dif-
ference can reflect another explanation. The involuntary 
patients' lack of distress may be due to their tho~ght dis-
order. In fact, the admitting psychiatrists also indicated 
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that thought disorganization was more likely to play a role 
in initiating hospitalization for committed patients than 
for voluntary patients. They also indicated that committed 
patients were more likely to be assaultive prior to admis-
sion. Gove and Fain (1977) concluded that upon admission, 
committed patients tended to have a more severe disorder 
than voluntary patients. 
A record was kept of how long it took to bring the pa-
tient's symptoms under control and it was discovered that it 
took considerably longer to bring the disorganization of the 
committed patients under control as opposed to the voluntary 
patients, and committed patients tended to have a longer hos-
pitalization. They also indicated that after controlling 
for severity of impairment, committed patients still had a 
longer hospitalization .. 
Citing data regardi~g whether or not patients had re-
sided in an institution prior to hospitalization and data as 
to whether or not the patients had to return to an institu-
tion, the authors concluded that the commitment process does 
not increase the patient's chance of becoming chronically 
institutionalized. The authors also examined follow-up data 
on the social performance of the patients. Following hos-
pitalization, there was a general improvement for both vol-
untary and committed patients. Gove and Fain (1977) con-
cluded here that "this provides strong evidence that hospi-
talization did not have a detrimental effect on either type 
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of patient and is consistent with the view that both types 
of patients can be helped by hospitalization" (p. 675). Pa-
tients were also followed up as to their own attitudes to-
wards being hospitalized. The majority of patients, both 
voluntary and conunitted, indicated that they saw themselves 
as being helped by hospitalization. 
Gove and Fain (1977) differed from Zwerling et al. in 
that after having analyzed their data, they concluded that 
there is nothing seriously debilitating in the commitment 
process and that, given. good treatment facilities, commit-
ment is a reasonable course of action when a patient is 
seriously ill. Despite reserverations cited in other re-
search about involuntary conunitment (Zwerling et al., 1975), 
the study above indicates that generally, involuntary com-
mitment is not debilitating and should be continued in those 
extreme cases when it is the only reasonable course of action. 
There are major differences between involuntary and 
voluntary patients on several variables. Committed patients 
usually manifest a more severe type of disorder which will 
likely have an effect on locus of control orientation, at 
least init~ally, when the patient is in acute distress. One 
way to control for this in a reasearch project would be to 
administer the locus of control measure both at the begin-
ning and near the end of treatment in a manner similar to 
Harrow and Ferrante's (1969) study. 
IV. RESEARCH PROJECT 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to determine if voluntary 
versus involuntary committed mental health patients differ 
in terms of their locus of control orientation. For this 
study, the instrument used was Rotter's Internal-External 
(I-E) Locus of Control Scale which measures the degree that 
a person perceives his own ability to control events through 
his own actions. This measure of generalized expectancies 
was chosen for the following reasons: 
1) Since clinicians are often asked to make generalized 
predictions about a patient's future behavior, a measure of 
generalized, rather than specific, expectancies seems appro-
priate. 
2) The I-E scale has never been used in research spe-
cific to voluntary versus involuntary patients. 
3) The I-E scale has demonstrated its reliability in 
a variety of research. 
4) Levenson (1973) administered her I, P, and C scales 
to patients to compare those involuntarily committed pa-
tients with the voluntary patients, and learned that invol-
untary patients held the attitude that powerful others con-
trolled their lives. This is an external orientation, and 
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it is expected that on the I-E scale, committed patients 
would also score in an external direction. 
Using Rotter's (1966) I-E scale to measure locus of 
control, this paper was concerned with the following hypo-
theses: 
1. There is a significant difference in locus of con-
trol scores between voluntary and involuntarily committed 
psychiatric patients. As has been shown, voluntary patients 
play a role in their own hospitalization, while committed 
patients do not. Since the voluntary patients had a hand in 
the initiation of their treatment, it is expected that they 
would score significantly more often as being internally 
oriented. Also, the voluntary group is more likely to have 
a large group of depressives, and previous studies (Harrow 
and Ferrante, 1969) show them more likely to score in the 
internal range. Schizophrenics, on the other hand, are more 
likely to be committed because of their thought disorgani-
zation, and previous research (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969) 
indicates that on the I-E scale, they score in the external 
range of the locus continuum. For these reasons, a signifi-
cant difference in locus of control scores is expected, with 
voluntary patients scoring in the internal range, and com-
mitted patients scoring more in the external range. 
2. Locus of control scores in the committed and volun-
tary patients will change at the end of treatment, after the 
patient has been stabilized. Previous research indicates 
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that after seven weeks of treatment, patients score more 
internally (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969), as they experienced 
symptom relief. Gove and Fain (1977) reported that psychi-
atric patients, in general, come to see themselves as being 
helped by the hospitalization, and this included both volun-
tary and committed patients. Similar improvements, as 
stabilization is implemented, seem likely to occur in the 
setting being studied here as well. It is expected that to-
wards the end of treatment, both voluntary and involuntary 
patients would score more in the internal direction. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 32 male and 33 female psychiatric 
patients admitted to the Orange County, Florida Crisis 
Stabilization Unit (CSU), described below. These subjects 
represent various types of psychiatric diagnoses and prob-
lems requiring hospitalization. Some of the subjects had 
been placed involuntarily as per Florida statutes, while 
others were voluntary patients. All patients at the CSU are 
diagnosed according to the Diagnostic and Statistical M~nual 
of Mental Disorders, Edition III (DSM III), and the diag-
nosis was determined by a licensed, practicing psychiatrist 
on the unit. Demographically, the patient sample is typical 
of inpatient settings housing indigent patients. The female 
patients ranged in age from 15 to 58 years with the mean 
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age being 30.9. Males ranged from 16 to 57 years with the 
mean age being 28.5. Of the total sample of 65 patients, 37 
had a prior history of psychiatric hospitalization. Of the 
33 voluntary patients, 16 had been hospitalized previously, 
as compared to 21 of the 32 involuntary patients. The aver-
age length of stay was 6.1 days for the voluntary patients 
and 7.6 days for involuntary patients. All of the patients 
sampled were considered unable to pay for psychiatric 
treatment because they typically had an income (one person) 
of under $390.00 per month. (This is the case for all pa-
tients admitted to the CSU). This information was collected 
by checking each patient's clinical record after completion 
of Rotter's I-E (1966) questionnaire. 
Setting 
The research was conducted at the psychiatric facility 
mentioned above, the CSU. This 30 bed unit relies on milieu, 
group and recreational therapy, with ataractic medications 
( tranquilizers, antidepressants) used consistently. Be-
sides the psychiatrists, the CSU staff consists of psychia-
tric nurses, social workers, technicians, and aides, all of 
whom are in direct contact with the patient during treatment. 
This treatment staff helps to facilitate change through 
teaching responsibility for behavior, control and awareness 
of symptoms and learning socialization skills (often with 
support and follow-up thro~gh local mental health centers)· 
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The CSU is an open, rather than secure, psychiatric facil-
ity, but both voluntary and involuntary patients are treated 
there. At the CSU, crisis stabilization provides a protec-
tive environment, usually not exceeding five days. One goal 
of treatment is to facilitate rapid recovery so that the pa-
tient can return to the community. At times, due to the 
severity of a person's illness, a return to the community is 
not practicable, and other arrangements (such as placement 
at a state hospital or longer treatment at the CSU) are made. 
Procedure 
Rotter's (1966) I-E Locus of Control scale was indivi-
dually administered by this experimenter to patients ad-
mitted to the CSU described above. An attempt was made to 
administer this measure to each consecutive admission with-
in 24 hours of that actual admission. Three patients chose 
not to participate, while e~ght more remained too acutely 
ill to successfully complete the questionnaire. The I-E 
scale was also readrninistered to forty-one of the above pa-
tients prior to their discharge from the CSU. The other 
24 patients either eloped (left the CSU without permission), 
declined, or were discharged before the I-E scale could be 
readministered. This measure was administered to each pa-
tient in a private room at the CSU where the patient was ob-
served by the experimenter. Instructions for this scale are 
as follows: (Rotter, 1966): 
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This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which 
certain important events in our society affect differ-
ent people. Each item consists of a pair of alterna-
tives lettered a or b. Please select the one statement 
of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly be-
lieve to be more true rather than the one you think you 
should choose or the one you would like to be true. 
This is a measure of personal belief; obviously, there 
are no right or wrong answers ... Please answer these 
items carefully but do not spend too much time on any 
one item. Be sure to find an answer for every choice ... 
In some instances, you may discover that you believe 
both statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure 
to select the one you more strongly believe to be the 
case as far as you're concerned. Also, try to respond 
to each item independently when making your choice; do 
not be influenced by your previous choice (p. 26). 
The patients were given the questionnaire (Rotter's I-E 
scale) which required them to circle their responses either 
a or b. Scoring was accomplished by adding one point each 
time an external statement was selected by the subject, with 
the range of scores being from 0 to 23. The I-E scale is a 
forced choice scale, with 29 items. Six filler questions 
are included which are not scored. The 23 items which are 
critical to this study attempt to measure the subject's 
perceptions as to his or her own ability to control events 
as being a consequence of his or her own actions and beliefs. 
V. RESULTS 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to deter-
mine if there was a significant difference in locus of con-
trol scores between males and females. Results were similar 
to Rotter's (1966) findings that differences between male 
and female college students was insignificant. A t score 
of -1.342 failed to show any difference due to sex. Thus, 
the data were pooled and no sex differentiation was con-
sidered in subsequent analyses. 
A two way factorial analysis of variance was performed 
to determine differences in the patient's initial locus of 
control scores. The independent variables were commitment 
status (involuntary and voluntary), diagnosis (thought dis-
orders, affective disorders and other psychiatric diagnoses). 
The dependent measure was the I-E score. Analysis of 
variance results are summarized in Table I. No significant 
difference was found due to commitment status (F [l,59] = 
1.0191). The interaction of status and diagnosis also was 
nonsignificant (F [2,59] = .1979). This is in contrast to 
Harrow and Ferrante's (1969) finding that I-E scores were 
influenced by diagnosis. 
I-E score changes were also examined comparing patients 




Analysis of Variance Comparing 
Difference Scores on First 
Administration of the I-E Scale 
Source df MS 
Commitment status 
(voluntary versus 




orders) 2, 59 3.7541 






was predicted that both voluntary and involuntary patients 
would score in a more internal direction. Of the original 
65 patients, 41 completed the I-E scale prior to discharge. 
Using the data obtained from these patients, a 2 x 3 x 2 
analysis of variance was performed utilizing commitment 
status, diagnosis, and the score obtained at admission or 
discharge. Mean scores are presented in Table II, and F 
ratios are presented in Table III. 
As in the earlier analysis, no significant differences 
were found due to status (F [1,35] = .8145), diagnosis 
(F [2,35] = .1478), or their interaction (F [2,35) = .4412) 
which is similar to results obtained by Harrow and Ferrante 
(1969). Differences due to score changes at admission ver-
sus discharge were not significant (F ~l,3D = 2.2049). In-
teractional effects due to status and change scores were in-
significant (F cl,35) = .0100) I as well as interactional 
effects due to diagnosis and change scores (F (2,35] = 1.4125). 
The interaction effect of all three (status, diagnosis, and 




Mean Scores Obtained on Both 
Administrations of the I-E 
Scale by Diagnosis and Commitment Status 
First Administration 
Diagnosis Voluntary Involuntary 
Thought Disorder 9.57 9.85 
Affective Disorder 9.30 11.5 
Other Disorders 8.83 10.125 
Second Administration 
Thought Disorder 10.0 9.833 
Affective Disorder 8.50 7.75 
Other Disorders 6.33 11.0 
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Table III 
Analysis of Variance Comparing 
Difference Scores on Both 
Administrations of the I-E Scale 
Source df MS 
Commitment status 1, 35 27.9199 
Diagnosis 2 I 35 5.0630 
Interaction (status x 
diagnosis) 2 I 35 15.1239 
Change Scores 
(admission versus 
discharge) 1, 35 12.0383 
Interactions (status x 
change scores) 1, 35 .0547 
Interactions (diagnosis 
x change scores) 2, 35 7.7121 
Interactions (status x 
diagnosis x change 










The first hypothesis that there would be a significant 
difference in locus of control scores was not confirmed. 
This is in contrast to the original expectation that there 
would be significant differences based on Levenson's (1973) 
findings that involuntary patients perceived control by 
powerful others more often than voluntary patients. It was 
also expected that diagnosis would be a significant factor 
here, since other research (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969), in-
dicated that I-E scores were influenced by acute psychiatric 
symptoms. This expectation was not confirmed either, as no 
significant difference was found due to diagnosis. 
It should be noted that both Harrow and Ferrante's 
(1969) and Levenson's (1973) studies, patients who completed 
the locus of control questionnaires were hospitalized for a 
long term period, usually several weeks, in a state hospital 
setting. This is unlike the patients at the CSU who were 
admitted in acute crisis and length of stay averaged just 
under one week (6.9 days). Also, the patients at the CSU 
were admitted while in acute crisis, as compared to patients 
at the state hospital. Several psychotic patients (n=B) at 
the CSU remained too acute to complete the questionnaire. 
Many of the other psychotic patients who did complete the 
I-E scale did so only after they were medicated for at least 
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one whole day, thus reducing symptoms. Most of the non-
psychotic patients {n=34) completed the I-E scale immedi-
ately upon admission. 
Previous research {Fontana, Klein, Lewis, and Levine, 
1968) demonstrated that psychiatric patients were able to 
present as sick or healthy, depending upon their purposes. 
Several of the committed patients who had extremely low I-E 
scores {n=S) faced the prospect of having a court appearance 
to determine whether they would be committed for a longer 
period of time. It is logical to speculate that these pa-
tients may have been trying to present themselves as inter-
nally oriented so as to appear normal to the staff and 
hence be able to influence their court hearing. Their low 
I-E scores drove down the overall mean scores for involuntary 
patients, possibly accounting for the nonsignificant results. 
The hypothesis that locus of control scores would, as 
a result of treatment, change in a more internal direction 
was not confirmed. This is consistent with Harrow and 
Ferrante's (1969) result that, overall, there were no sig-
nificant differences in I-E scores due to treatment. At the 
end of six weeks treatment, Harrow and Ferrante found that 
patients labelled both manic depressives and character dis-
orders had significant change scores. There was not any 
significant differences in I-E scores due to diagnosis at 
the end of treatment in this study. Here, the length of 
hospitalization is again an important issue. Patients in 
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Harrow and Ferrante's (1969) study had a far longer treat-
ment period (six weeks) than did patients admitted to the 
CSU (who averaged 6.9 days). 
As cited above, Levenson (1973) found that involuntary 
patients perceived control by powerful others and Harrow 
and Ferrante (1969) found that the interaction of diagnosis 
and length of hospitalization was significant. With the 
exception of these two results, the bulk of research in-
dicates that, overall, locus of control orientation does not 
change as a result of psychiatric treatment. 
Gove and Fain (1977) reached a similar conclusion after 
assessing state hospital psychiatric patients in terms of 
demographic variables and the nature and severity of their 
problems. 
There is nothi~g in these results supporting the notion 
that in terms of treatment, involuntary commitment is detri-
mental to the patient, as Szasz (1977) had concluded. Since 
the debate concerning involuntary hospitalization continues, 
it remains relevant to pursue the effects of involuntary 
commitment on psychiatric treatment. Research involving 
other personality variables in relation to involuntary com-
mitment can help to clarify what does happen to patients' 
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